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Abstract
Text-based analysis methods enable an adversary to reveal
privacy relevant author attributes such as gender, age and
can identify the text’s author. Such methods can compro-
mise the privacy of an anonymous author even when the
author tries to remove privacy sensitive content. In this pa-
per, we propose an automatic method, called Adversarial
Author Attribute Anonymity Neural Translation (A4NT),
to combat such text-based adversaries. Unlike prior works
on obfuscation, we propose a system that is fully auto-
matic and learns to perform obfuscation entirely from
data. This allows us to easily apply the A4NT system
to obfuscate different author attributes. We propose a
sequence-to-sequence language model, inspired by ma-
chine translation, and an adversarial training framework to
design a system which learns to transform the input text to
obfuscate author attributes without paired data. We also
propose and evaluate techniques to impose constraints
on our A4NT to preserve the semantics of the input text.
A4NT learns to make minimal changes to the input to suc-
cessfully fool author attribute classifiers, while preserving
the meaning of the input text. Our experiments on two
datasets and three settings show that the proposed method
is effective in fooling the author attribute classifiers and
thus improves the anonymity of authors.
1 Introduction
Natural language processing (NLP) methods includ-
ing stylometric tools enable identification of authors of
anonymous texts by analyzing stylistic properties of the
text [1–3]. NLP-based tools have also been applied to
profiling users by determining their private attributes like
age and gender [4]. These methods have been shown
to be effective in various settings like blogs, reddit com-
ments, twitter text [5] and in large scale settings with up
to 100,000 possible authors [6]. In a recent famous case,
authorship attribution tools were used to help confirm J.K
Rowling as the real author of A Cuckoo’s Calling which
was written by Ms. Rowling under pseudonymity [7].
This case highlights the privacy risks posed by these tools.
Apart from threat of identification of an anonymous
author, the NLP-based tools also make authors suscep-
tible to profiling. Text analysis has been shown to be
effective in predicting age group [8], gender [9] and to
an extent even political preferences [10]. By determining
such private attributes an adversary can build user profiles
which have been used for manipulation through targeted
advertising, both for commercial and political goals [11].
Since the NLP based profiling methods utilize the stylis-
tic properties of the text to break the authors anonymity,
they are immune to defense measures like pseudonymity,
masking the IP addresses or obfuscating the posting pat-
terns. The only way to combat them is to modify the
content of the text to hide stylistic attributes. Prior work
has shown that while people are capable of altering their
writing styles to hide their identity [12], success rate de-
pends on the authors skill and doing so consistently is
hard for even skilled authors [13]. Currently available
solutions to obfuscate authorship and defend against NLP-
methods has been largely restricted to semi-automatic
solutions suggesting possible changes to the user [14]
or hand-crafted transformations to text [15] which need
re-engineering on different datasets [15]. This however
limits the applicability of these defensive measures be-
yond the specific dataset it was designed on. To the best
of our knowledge, text rephrasing using generic machine
translation tools [16] is the only prior work offering a
fully automatic solution to author obfuscation which can
be applied across datasets. But as found in prior work [17]
and further demonstrated with our experiments, generic
machine translation based obfuscation fails to sufficiently
hide the identity and protect against attribute classifiers.
Additionally the focus in prior research has been to-
wards protecting author identity. However, obfuscating
identity does not guarantee protection of private attributes
like age and gender. Determining attributes is generally
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easier than predicting the exact identity for NLP-based
adversaries, mainly due to former being small closed-set
prediction task compared to later which is larger and po-
tentially open-set prediction task. This makes obfuscating
attributes a difficult but an important problem.
Our work. We propose an unified automatic system
(A4NT) to obfuscate authors text and defend against NLP
adversaries. A4NT follows the imitation model of defense
discussed in [12] and protects against various attribute
classifiers by learning to imitate the writing style of a
target class. For example, A4NT learns to hide the gender
of a female author by re-synthesizing the text in the style
of the male class. This imitation of writing style is learnt
by adversarially training [18] our style-transfer network
against the attribute classifier. Our A4NT network learns
the target style by learning to fool the authorship clas-
sifiers into mis-classifying the text it generates as target
class. This style transfer is accomplished while aiming to
retain the semantic content of the input text.
Unlike many prior works on authorship obfusca-
tion [14, 15], we propose an end-to-end learnable author
anonymization solution, allowing us to apply our method
not only to authorship obfuscation but to the anonymiza-
tion of different author attributes including identity, gen-
der and age with a unified approach. We illustrate this
by successfully applying our model on three different at-
tribute anonymization settings on two different datasets.
Through empirical evaluation, we show that the proposed
approach is able to fool the author attribute classifiers
in all three settings effectively and better than the base-
lines. While there are still challenges to overcome before
applying the system to multiple attributes and situations
with very little data, we believe that A4NT offers a new
data driven approach to authorship obfuscation which can
easily adapt to improving NLP-based adversaries.
Technical challenges: We design our A4NT network ar-
chitecture based on the sequence-to-sequence neural ma-
chine translation model [19]. A key challenge in learning
to perform style transfer, compared to other sequence-
to-sequence mapping tasks like machine translation, is
the lack of paired training data. Here, paired data refers
to datasets with both the input text and its correspond-
ing ground-truth output text. In obfuscation setting, this
means having a large dataset with semantically same
sentences written in different styles corresponding to at-
tributes we want to hide. Such paired data is infeasible
to obtain and this has been a key hurdle in developing
automatic obfuscation methods. Some prior attempts
to perform text style transfer required paired training
data [20] and hence were limited in their applicability
beyond toy-data settings. We overcome this by training
our A4NT network within a generative adversarial net-
works (GAN) [18] framework. GAN framework enables
us to train the A4NT network to generate samples that
match the target distribution without need for paired data.
We characterize the performance of our A4NT network
along two axes: privacy effectiveness and semantic simi-
larity. Using automatic metrics and human evaluation to
measure semantic similarity of the generated text to the in-
put, we show that A4NT offers a better trade-off between
privacy effectiveness and semantic similarity. We also an-
alyze the effectiveness of A4NT for protecting anonymity
for varying degrees of input text “difficulty”.
Contributions: In summary, the main contributions of
our paper are. (1): We propose a novel approach to au-
thorship obfuscation, that uses a style-transfer network
(A4NT) to automatically transform the input text to a tar-
get style and fool the attribute classifiers. The network is
trained without paired data using adversarial training. (2):
The proposed obfuscation solution is end-to-end trainable,
and hence can be applied to protect different author at-
tributes and on different datasets with no changes to the
overall framework. (3): Quantifying the performance of
our system on privacy effectiveness and semantic simi-
larity to input, we show that it offers a better trade-off
between the two metrics compared to baselines.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review prior work relating to four differ-
ent aspects of our work – author attribute detection (our
adversaries), authorship obfuscation (prior work), ma-
chine translation (basis of our A4NT network) and gener-
ative adversarial networks (training framework we use).
Authorship and attribute detection Machine learning
approaches where a set of text features are input to a clas-
sifier which learns to predict the author have been popular
in recent author attribution works [2]. These methods
have been shown to work well on large datasets [6], dupli-
cate author detection [21] and even on non-textual data
like code [22]. Sytlometric models can also be applied to
determine private author attributes like age or gender [4].
Classical author attribution methods rely on a prede-
fined set of features extracted from the input text [23].
Recently deep-learning methods have been applied to
learn to extract the features directly from data [3, 24].
[24] uses a multi-headed recurrent neural network (RNN)
to train a generative language model on each author’s text
and use the model’s perplexity on the test document to
predict the author. Alternatively, [3] uses convolutional
neural network (CNN) to train an author classifiers. To
show generality of our A4NT network, we test it against
both RNN and CNN based author attribute classifiers.
Authorship obfuscation Authorship obfuscation meth-
ods are adversarial in nature to stylometric methods of
author attribution; they try to change the style of in-
put text so that author identity is not discernible. The
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majority of prior works on author attribution are semi-
automatic [14, 25], where the system suggests authors to
make changes to the document by analyzing the stylo-
metric features. The few automatic obfuscation methods
have relied on general rephrasing methods like generic
machine translation [16] or on a predefined text trans-
formations [26]. Round-trip machine translation, where
input text is translated to multiple languages one after the
other until it is translated back to the source language, is
proposed as an automatic method of obfuscation in [16].
Recent work [26] obfuscates text by moving the stylo-
metric features towards the average values on the dataset
applying pre-defined transformations on input text.
We propose the first method to achieve fully automatic
obfuscation using text style transfer. This style transfer is
not pre-defined but learnt directly from data optimized for
fooling attribute classifiers. This allows us to apply our
model across datasets without extra engineering effort.
Machine translation The task of style-transfer of text
data shares similarities with the machine translation prob-
lem. Both involve mapping an input text sequence onto
an output text sequence. Style transfer can be thought of
as machine translation on the same language.
Large end-to-end trainable neural networks have be-
come a popular choice in machine translation [27, 28].
These methods are generally based on sequence-to-
sequence recurrent models [19] consisting of two net-
works, an encoder which encodes the input sentence into
a fixed size vector and a decoder which maps this encod-
ing to a sentence in the target language.
We base our A4NT network architecture on the word-
level sequence-to-sequence language model [19]. Neu-
ral machine translation systems are trained with large
amounts of paired training data. However, in our setting,
obtaining paired data of the same text in different writ-
ing styles is not viable. We overcome the lack of paired
data by casting the task as matching style distributions
instead of matching individual sentences. Specifically,
our A4NT network takes an input text from a source dis-
tribution and generates text whose style matches the target
attribute distribution. This is learnt without paired data
using distribution matching methods. This reformulation
allows us to demonstrate the first successful application
of the machine translation models to the obfuscation task.
Generative adversarial networks Generative Adversar-
ial Networks (GAN) [18] are a framework for learning a
generative model to produce samples from a target dis-
tribution. It consists of two models, a generator and a
discriminator. The discriminator network learns to dis-
tinguish between the generated samples and real data
samples. Simultaneously, the generator learns to fool this
discriminator network thereby getting closer to the target
distribution. In this two-player game, a fully optimized
generator perfectly mimics the target distribution [18].
Figure 1: GAN framework to train our A4NT network.
Input sentence is transformed by A4NT to match the style
of the target attribute. This output is evaluated using the
attribute classifier and semantic consistency loss. A4NT is
trained by backpropagating through these losses.
We train our A4NT network within the GAN frame-
work, directly optimizing A4NT to fool the attribute clas-
sifiers by matching style distribution of a target class. A
recent approach to text style-transfer proposed in [29] also
utilizes GANs to perform style transfer using unpaired
data. However, the solution proposed in [29] changes the
meaning of the input text significantly during style trans-
fer and is applied on sentiment transfer task. In contrast,
authorship obfuscation task requires the generated text
to preserve the semantics of the input. We address this
problem by proposing two methods to improve semantic
consistency between the input and the A4NT output.
3 Author Attribute Anonymization
We propose an author adversarial attribute anonymizing
neural translation (A4NT) network to defend against NLP-
based adversaries. The proposed solution includes the
A4NT Network , the adversarial training scheme, and se-
mantic and language losses to learn to protect private
attributes. The A4NT network transforms the input text
from a source attribute class to mimic the style of a differ-
ent attribute class, and thus fools the attribute classifiers.
Technically, A4NT network is essentially solving a se-
quence to sequence mapping problem — from text se-
quence in the source domain to text in the target domain
— similar to machine translation. Exploiting this similar-
ity, we design our A4NT network based on the sequence-
to-sequence neural language models [19], widely used
in neural machine translation [27]. These models have
proven effective when trained with large amounts of
paired data and are also deployed commercially [28]. If
there were paired data in source and target attributes,
we could train our A4NT network exactly like a ma-
chine translation model, with standard supervised learn-
ing. However, such paired data is infeasible to obtain as
it would require the same text written in multiple styles.
To address the lack of paired data, we cast the
anonymization task as learning a generative model,
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the attribute classifier network.
The LSTM encoder embeds the input sentence into a
vector. Sentence encoding is passed to linear projection
followed by softmax layer to obtain class probabilities
Zxy(sx), which transforms an input text sample sx drawn
from source attribute distribution sx ∼ X , to look like sam-
ples from the target distribution sy ∼ Y . This formulation
enables us to train the A4NT network Zxy(sx) with the
GAN framework to produce samples close to the target
distribution Y , using only unpaired samples from X and
Y . Figure 1 shows this overall framework.
The GAN framework consists of two models, a genera-
tor producing synthetic samples to mimic the target data
distribution, and a discriminator which tries to distinguish
real data from the synthesized “fake” samples from the
generator. The two models are trained adversarially, i.e.
the generator tries to fool the discriminator and the dis-
criminator tries to correctly identify the generator samples.
We use an attribute classifier as the discriminator and the
A4NT network as the generator. The A4NT network, in
trying to fool the attribute classification network, learns
to transform the input text to mimic the style of the target
attribute and protect the attribute anonymity.
For our A4NT network to be a practically useful defen-
sive measure, the text output by this network should be
able to fool the attribute classifier while also preserving
the meaning of the input sentence. If we could measure
the semantic difference between the generated text and
the input text it could be used to penalize deviations from
the input sentence semantics. Computing this semantic
distance perfectly would need true understanding of the
meaning of input sentence, which is beyond the capabili-
ties of current natural language processing techniques. To
address this aspect of style transfer, we experiment with
various proxies to measure and penalize changes to input
semantics, which will be discussed in Section 3.4. Fol-
lowing subsections will describe each module in detail.
3.1 Author Attribute Classifiers
We build our attribute classifiers using neural networks
that predict the attribute label by directly operating on the
text data. This is similar to recent approaches in author-
ship recognition [3, 24] where, instead of hand-crafted
features used in classical stylometry, neural networks
are used to directly predict author identity from raw text
data. However, unlike in these prior works, our focus is
attribute classification and obfuscation. We train our clas-
sifiers with recurrent networks operating at word-level, as
opposed to character-level models used in [3, 24] for two
reasons. We found that the word-level models give good
performance on all three attribute-classification tasks we
experiment with (see Section 5.1). Additionally, they are
much faster than character-level models, making it feasi-
ble to use them in GAN training described in Section 3.2.
Specifically, our attribute classifier Ax to detect attribute
value x is shown in Figure 2. It consists of a Long-Short
Term Memory (LSTM) [30] encoder network to compute
an embedding of the input sentence into a fixed size vector.
It learns to encode the parts of the sentence most relevant
to the classification task into the embedding vector, which
for attribute prediction is mainly the stylistic properties
of the text. This embedding is input to a linear layer and
a softmax layer to output the class probabilities.
Given an input sentence sx = {w0,w1, · · · ,wn−1}, the
words are one-hot encoded and then embedded into
fixed size vectors using the word-embedding layer shown
in Figure 2 to obtain vectors {v0,v1, · · · ,vn−1}. This word
embedding layer encodes similarities between words into
the word vectors and can help deal with large vocabulary
sizes. The word vectors are randomly initialized and then
learned from the data during training of the model. This
approach works better than using pre-trained word vec-
tors like word2vec [31] or Glove [32] since the learned
word-vectors can encode similarities most relevant to the
attribute classification task at hand.
This sequence of word vectors is recursively passed
through an LSTM to obtain a sequence of outputs
{h0,h1, · · · ,hn−1}. We refer the reader to [30] for the
exact computations performed to get the LSTM output.
Now sentence embedding is obtained by concatenation
of the final LSTM output and the mean of the LSTM
outputs from other time-steps.
E(sx) =
[
hn−1;
1
n−1∑hn−1
]
(1)
At the last time-step the LSTM network has seen all the
words in the sentence and can encode a summary of the
sentence in its output. However, using LSTM outputs
from all time-steps, instead of just the final one, speeds
up training due to improved flow of gradients through
the network. Finally, E(sx) is passed through linear and
softmax layers to obtain class probabilities, for each class
ci. The network is then trained using cross-entropy loss.
pauth(ci|sx) = softmax(W ·E(sx)) (2)
Loss(Ax) =∑
i
ti(sx) log(pauth(ci|sx)) (3)
where t(sx) is the one-hot encoding of the true class of sx.
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Figure 3: Block diagram of the A4NT network. First
LSTM encoder embeds the input sentence into a vector.
The decoder maps this sentence encoding to the output
sequence. Gumbel sampler produces “soft” samples from
the softmax distribution to allow backpropagation.
The same network architecture is applied for all our at-
tribute prediction tasks including identity, age and gender.
3.2 The A4NT Network
A key design goal for the A4NT network is that it is
trainable purely from data to obfuscate the author at-
tributes.This is a significant departure from prior works on
author obfuscation [14, 26] that rely on hand-crafted rules
for text modification to achieve obfuscation. The methods
relying on hand-crafted rules are limited in applicability
to specific datasets they were designed for.
To achieve this goal, we base our A4NT network Zxy,
shown in Figure 3, on a recurrent sequence-to-sequence
neural translation model [19] (Seq2Seq) popular in many
sequence mapping tasks. As seen from the wide-range
of applications mapping text-to-text [27], speech-to-
text [33], text-to-part of speech [34], the Seq2Seq models
can effectively learn to map input sequences to arbitrary
output sequences, with appropriate training. They op-
erate on raw text data and alleviate the need for hand-
crafted features or rules to transform the style of input
text, predominantly used in prior works on author obfus-
cation [14, 26]. Instead, appropriate text transformations
can be learnt directly from data. This flexibility allows
us to easily apply the same A4NT network and training
scheme to different datasets and settings.
The A4NT network Zxy consists of two components,
an encoder and a decoder modules, similar to standard
sequence-to-sequence models. The encoder embeds the
variable length input sentence into a fixed size vector
space. The decoder maps the vectors in this embedding
space to output text sequences in the target style. The
encoder is an LSTM network, sharing the architecture
of the sentence encoder in Section 3.1. The same archi-
tecture applies here as the task here is also to embed the
input sentence sx into a fixed size vector EG(sx). How-
ever, EG(sx) should learn to represent the semantics of the
input sentence allowing the decoder network to generate
a sentence with similar meaning but in a different style.
The sentence embedding from the encoder is the input
to the decoder LSTM which generates the output sen-
tence one word at a time. At each step t, the decoder
LSTM takes EG(sx) and the previous output word wot−1
to produce a probability distribution over the vocabulary.
Sampling from this distribution outputs the next word.
hdect (sx) = LSTM [EG(sx),Wemb(w˜t−1)] (4)
p(w˜t |sx) = softmaxV (Wdec ·hdect (sx)) (5)
w˜t = sample(p(w˜t |sx)) (6)
where Wemb is the word embedding, Wdec matrix maps the
LSTM output to vocabulary size and V is the vocabulary.
In most applications of Seq2Seq models, the networks
are trained using parallel training data, consisting of input
and ground-truth output sentence pairs. A sentence is
input to the encoder and propagated through the network
and the network is trained to maximize the likelihood
of generating the paired ground-truth output sentence.
However, in our setting, we do not have access to such
parallel training data of text in different styles and the
A4NT network Zxy is trained in an unsupervised setting.
We address the lack of parallel training data by using
the GAN framework to train the A4NT network. In this
framework, the A4NT network Zxy learns by generating
text samples and improving itself iteratively to produce
text that the attribute classifier, Ay, classifies as target
attribute. A benefit of GANs is that the A4NT network is
directly optimized to fool the attribute classifiers. It can
hence learn to make transformations to the parts of the
text which are most revealing of the attribute at hand, and
so hide the attribute with minimal changes.
However, to apply the GAN framework, we need to
differentiate through the samples generated by Zxy. The
word samples from p(w˜t |sx) are discrete tokens and are
not differentiable. Following [35], we apply the Gumbel-
Softmax approximation [36] to obtain differentiable soft
samples and enable end-to-end GAN training. See Ap-
pendix A for details.
Splitting decoder: To transfer styles between attribute
pairs, x and y, in both directions, we found it ineffective to
use the same network Zxy. A single network Zxy is unable
to sufficiently switch its output word distributions solely
on a binary condition of target attribute. Nonetheless,
using a separate network for each ordered pair of attributes
is prohibitively expensive. A good compromise we found
is to share the encoder to embed the input sentence but use
different decoders for style transfer between each ordered
pair of attributes. Sharing the encoder allows the two
networks to share a significant number of parameters and
enables the attribute specific decoders to deal with words
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Figure 4: Illustrating use of GAN framework and cyclic
semantic loss to train a pair of A4NT networks.
found only in the vocabulary of the other attribute group
using shared sentence and word embeddings.
3.3 Style Loss with GAN
We train the two A4NT networks Zxy and Zyx in the GAN
framework to produce samples which are indistinguish-
able from samples from distributions of attributes y and x
respectively, without having paired sentences from x and
y. Figure 4 shows this training framework.
Given a sentence sx written by author with attribute x,
the A4NT network outputs a sentence s˜y = Zxy(sx). This
is passed to the attribute classifier for attribute y, Ay, to ob-
tain probability pauth(y|s˜y). Zxy tries to fool the classifier
Ay into assigning high probability to its output, whereas
Ay tries to assign low probability to sentences produced
by Zxy while assigning high probability to real sentences
sy written by y. The same process is followed to train the
A4NT network from y to x, with x and y swapped. The
loss functions used to train the A4NT network and the
attribute classifiers in this setting is given by:
L(Ay) =− log(pauth(y|sy))− log(1− pauth(y|s˜y)) (7)
Lstyle(Zxy) =− log(pauth(y|s˜y)) (8)
The two networks Zxy and Ay are adversarially compet-
ing with each other when minimizing the above loss func-
tions. At optimality it is guaranteed that the distribution of
samples produced by Zxy is identical to the distribution of
y [18]. However, we want the A4NT network to only imi-
tate the style of y, while keeping the content from x. Thus,
we explore methods to enforce the semantic consistency
between the the input sentence and the A4NT output.
3.4 Preserving Semantics
We want the output sentence, s˜y, produced by Zxy(sx) to
not only fool the attribute classifier, but also to preserve
the meaning of the input sentence sx. We propose a se-
mantic loss Lsem(s˜y,sx) to quantify the meaning changed
Figure 5: Semantic consistency in A4NT networks is en-
forced by maximizing cyclic reconstruction probability.
during the anonymization by A4NT . Simple approaches
like matching words in s˜y and sx can severely limit the
effectiveness of anonymization, as it penalizes even syn-
onyms or alternate phrasing. In the following subsection
we will discuss two approaches to define Lsem, and later
in Section 5 we compare these approaches quantitatively.
3.4.1 Cycle Constraints
One could evaluate how semantically close is s˜y to sx by
evaluating how easy it is to reconstruct sx from s˜y. If s˜y
means exactly the same as sx, there should be no informa-
tion loss and we should be able to perfectly reconstruct
sx from s˜y. We could use the A4NT network in the re-
verse direction to obtain a reconstruction, s¨x = Zyx(s˜y)
and compare it to input sentence sx. Such an approach,
referred to as cycle constraint, has been used in image
style transfer [37], where l1 distance is used to compare
the reconstructed image and the original image to impose
semantic relatedness penalty. However, in our case l1
distance is not meaningful to compare s¨x and sx, as they
are sequences of possibly different lengths. Even a sin-
gle word insertion or deletion in s¨x can cause the entire
sequence to mismatch and be penalized by the l1 distance.
A simpler and more stable alternative we use is to forgo
the reconstruction and just compute the likelihood of re-
construction of sx when applying reverse style-transfer
on s˜y. This likelihood is simple to obtain from the re-
verse A4NT network Zyx using the word distribution prob-
abilities at the output. This cyclic loss computation is
illustrated in Figure 5. Duly, we compute reconstruction
probability Pr(sx|s˜y) and define the semantic loss as:
Pr(sx|s˜y) =
n−1
∏
t=0
pzyx(wt |s˜y) (9)
Lsem(s˜y,sx) =− logPr(sx|s˜y) (10)
The lower the semantic loss Lsem, the higher the recon-
struction probability and thus more meaning of the input
sentence sx is preserved in the style-transfer output s˜y.
3.4.2 Semantic Embedding Loss
Alternative approach to measure the semantic loss is to
embed the two sentences, s˜y and sx, into a semantic space
and compare the two embedding vectors using l1 distance.
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The idea is that a semantic embedding method puts simi-
lar meaning sentences close to each other in this vector
space. This approach is used in many natural language
processing tasks, for example in semantic entailment [38]
Since we do not have annotations of semantic related-
ness on our datasets, it is not possible to train a semantic
embedding model but instead we have to rely on pre-
trained models known to have good transfer learning per-
formance. Several such semantic sentence embeddings
are available in the literature [38, 39]. We use the univer-
sal sentence embedding model from [38], pre-trained on
the Stanford natural language inference dataset [40].
We embed the two sentences using this semantic em-
bedding model F and use the l1 distance to compare the
two embeddings and define the semantic loss as:
Lsem(s˜y,sx) =∑
dim
∣∣F(sx)−F(s˜y)∣∣ (11)
3.5 Smoothness with Language Loss
The A4NT network can minimize the style and the se-
mantic losses, while still producing text which is broken
and grammatically incorrect. To minimize the style loss
the A4NT network needs to add words typical of the tar-
get attribute style, while minimizing the semantic loss, it
needs to retain the semantically relevant words from the
input text. However neither of these two losses explicitly
enforces correct grammar and word order of s˜.
On the other hand, unconditional neural language mod-
els are good at producing grammatically correct text. The
likelihood of the sentence produced by our A4NT model
s˜ under an unconditional language model, My, trained on
the text by target attribute authors y, is a good indicator
of the grammatical correctness of s˜. The higher the like-
lihood, the more likely the generated text s˜ has syntactic
properties seen in the real data. Therefore, we add an ad-
ditional language smoothness loss on s˜ in order to enforce
Z to produce syntactically correct text.
Llang(s˜) =− logMy(s˜) (12)
Overall loss function: The A4NT network is trained
with a weighted combination of the three losses: style
loss, semantic consistency and language smoothing loss.
Ltot(Zxy) = wstyLstyle+wsemLsem+wlLlang (13)
We chose the above three weights so that the magnitude
of the weighted loss terms are approximately equal at the
beginning of training. Model training was not sensitive to
exact values of the weights chosen that way.
Implementation details: We implement our model using
the Pytorch framework [41]. The networks are trained by
optimizing the loss functions described with stochastic
gradient descent using the RMSprop algorithm [42]. The
A4NT network is pre-trained as an autoencoder, i.e to
reconstruct the input sentence, before being trained with
the loss function described in (13). During GAN training,
the A4NT network and the attribute classifiers are trained
for one minibatch each alternatively. We will open source
our code, models and data at the time of publication.
4 Experimental Setup
We test our A4NT network on obfuscation of three differ-
ent attributes of authors on two different datasets. The
three attributes we experiment with include author’s age
(under 20 vs over 20), gender (male vs female authors),
and author identities (setting with two authors).
4.1 Datasets
We use two real world datasets for our experiments: Blog
Authorship corpus [43] and Political Speech dataset. The
datasets are from very different sources with distinct lan-
guage styles, the first being from mini blogs written by
several anonymous authors, and the second from political
speeches of two US presidents Barack Obama and Donald
Trump. This allows us to show that our approach works
well across very different language corpora.
Blog dataset: The blog dataset is a large collection of
micro blogs from blogger.com collected by [43]. The
dataset consists of 19,320 “documents” along with anno-
tation of author’s age, gender, occupation and star-sign.
Each document is a collection of all posts by a single
author. We utilize this dataset in two different settings;
split by gender (referred to as blog-gender setting) and
split by age annotation (blog-age setting). In the blog-age
setting, we group the age annotations into two groups,
teenagers (age between 13-18) and adults (age between
23-45) to obtain data with binary age labels. Age-groups
19-22 are missing in the original dataset. Since the dataset
consists of free form text written while blogging with no
proper sentence boundaries markers, we use the Stanford
CoreNLP tool to segment the documents into sentences.
All numbers are replaced with the NUM token.
Political speech dataset: To test the limits of how far
style imitation based anonymization can help protect au-
thor identity, we also test our model on two well known
political figures with very different verbal styles. We col-
lected the transcriptions of political speeches of Barack
Obama and Donald Trump made available by the The
American Presidency Project [44]. While the two authors
talk about similar topics they have highly distinctive styles
and vocabularies, making it a challenging dataset for our
A4NT network. The dataset consists of 372 speeches,
with about 65,000 sentences in total as shown in Table I.
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Dataset Attributes # Documents # Sentences # Vocabulary
Speech Identity 372 65k 5.6k
Blog Age, Gender 19320 3.38 Mil 22k
Table I: Comparing statistics of the two datasets.
We treat each speech as a separate document when eval-
uating the classification results on document-level. This
dataset contains a significant amount of references to
named entities like people, organizations, etc. To avoid
that both attribute classifiers and the style transfer model
rely on these references to specific people, we use the
Stanford Named Entity Recognizer tool [45] to identify
and replace these entities with entity labels.
The comparison of the two datasets can be found in Ta-
ble I. The blog dataset is much larger and therefore we run
most of our evaluation on it. Using these two datasets, we
evaluate our model in three different attribute obfuscation
settings, namely age (blog-age), gender (blog-gender) and
identity obfuscation (speech dataset). Detailed analysis
of our model presented in Section 5.2 is done on the val-
idation split of the blog dataset, in the blog-age setting,
containing 2,799 documents and 518,268 sentences.
4.2 Evaluation Methods
We evaluate our models w.r.t. two different aspects:
(a) Privacy effectiveness, to measure how well the
A4NT network can fool the attribute classifiers and (b)
Semantic similarity, quantifying how much of the input
sentence semantics is preserved after style transfer.
To quantify privacy effectiveness we compare the F1-
score of the attribute classifiers on the original data
and the generated text. To mimic a real-world setting
where we will not have access to the parameters of the
attribute-classifier used by the adversary to train our
A4NT network, we test it against attribute classifiers
which have been separately trained on real data.
The F1-score for the attribute classifiers is defined as:
F1 = 2∗ precision∗ recall
precision+ recall
(14)
With successful style transfer, the attribute classifier will
mis-classify generated text and the F1-scores will drop.
We consider the obfuscation to be successful if the F1-
score drops below that of a a random guessing classifier.
Note that since the datasets are not perfectly balanced w.r.t
the binary attributes, the F1-score for random classifier
is not 0.5. The expected document-level F1-scores of
random guessing are 0.54 for the blog-age setting, 0.5 for
the blog-gender setting, and 0.61 for the speech data.
To quantify semantic similarity, we use the Meteor [46]
metric. It is used in machine translation and image cap-
tioning to evaluate the similarity of the candidate text
using a reference text. Meteor compares the candidate
text to one or more references by matching n-grams, al-
lowing for soft matches using synonym and paraphrase
tables. We use the Meteor score between the generated
and input text as the measure of semantic similarity.
However, the automatic evaluation for semantic simi-
larity is not perfectly correlated with human judgments,
especially with few reference sentences.To address this,
we additionally conduct a human evaluation study on a
subset of the test data of 745 sentences. We ask human
annotators on Amazon Mechanical Turk to judge the se-
mantic similarity of the generated text from our models.
No other information was collected from the annotators,
thereby keeping them anonymous. The annotators were
compensated for their work through AMT system. We
manually screened the text shown to the annotators to
make sure there was no obvious offensive content in them.
4.3 Baselines
We use the two baseline methods below to compare our
model with. Both chosen baselines are automatic obfus-
cation methods not relying on hand-crafted rules.
Autoencoder We train our A4NT network Z as an autoen-
coder, where it takes as input sx and tries to reproduce it
from the encoding. The autoencoder is trained similar to
a standard neural language model with cross entropy loss.
We train two such auto-encoders Zxx and Zyy for the two
attributes. Now simple style transfer can be achieved from
x to y by feeding the sentence sx to the autoencoder of
the other attribute class Zyy. Since Zyy is trained to output
text in the y domain, the sentence Zyy(sx) tends to look
similar to sentences in y. This model sets the baseline for
style transfer that can be achieved without cross domain
training using GANs, with the same network architecture
and the same number of parameters.
Google machine translation: A simple and accessible
approach to change writing style of a piece of text without
hand designed rules is to use generic machine transla-
tion software. The input text is translated from a source
language to multiple intermediate languages and finally
translating back to the source language. The hope is that
through this round-trip the style of the text has changed,
with the meaning preserved. This approach was used in
the PAN authorship obfuscation challenge recently [16].
We use the Google machine translation service1 to
perform round-trip translation on our input sentences. We
have tried a varying number of intermediate languages,
results of which will be discussed in Section 5 Since
Google limits api-calls and imposes character limits on
manual translation, we use this baseline only on the subset
of 745 sentences from the test set for human evaluation.
1https://translate.google.com/
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Setting Training Set Validation Set
Sentence Document Sentence Document
Speechdata 0.84 1.00 0.68 1.00
Blog-age 0.76 0.92 0.74 0.88
Blog-gender 0.64 0.93 0.52 0.75
Table II: F1-scores of the attribute classifiers. All of them
do well and better than the document-level random chance
(0.62 for speech), (0.53 for age), and (0.50 for gender).
5 Experimental Results
We test our model on the three settings discussed in
section 4 with the goal to understand if the proposed
A4NT network can fool the attribute classifiers to protect
the anonymity of the author attributes. Through quanti-
tative evaluation done in Section 5.1, we show that this
is indeed the case: our A4NT network learns to fool the
attribute classifiers across all three settings. We compare
the two semantic loss functions presented in Section 3.4
and show that the proposed reconstruction likelihood loss
does better than pre-trained semantic encoding.
However, this privacy gain comes with a trade-off. The
semantics of the input text is sometimes altered. In Sec-
tion 5.2, using qualitative examples, we analyze the fail-
ure modes of our system and identify limits up to which
style-transfer can help preserve anonymity.
We use three variants of our model in the following
study. The first model uses the semantic encoding loss de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2 and is referred to as FBsem. The
second uses the reconstruction likelihood loss discussed in
Section 3.4.1 instead, and is denoted by CycML. Finally,
CycML+Lang uses both cyclic maximum likelihood and
the language smoothing loss described in Section 3.5.
5.1 Quantitative Evaluation
Before analyzing the performance of our A4NT network,
we evaluate the attribute classifiers on the three settings
we use. For this, we train the attribute classifier model
in Section 3.1 on all three settings. Table II shows the
F1-scores of the attribute classifiers on the training and
the validation splits of the blog and the speech datasets.
Document-level scores are obtained from accumulating
the class log-probability scores on each sentence in a
document before picking the maximum scoring class as
the output label. We also tried hard voting to accumulate
sentence level decisions, and observed that the hard voting
results follow the same trend across datasets and splits.
On the smaller political speech dataset, the attribute
classifier is able to easily discriminate between the two
authors, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, achieving per-
fect F1-score of 1.0 on both the training and the validation
splits. The model also performs well on the age-group
classification, achieving F1-score of 0.88 on the valida-
tion set at the document-level. Gender classification turns
out to be the hardest to generalize, with a significant drop
in F1-score on the validation set compared to the training
set (down to 0.75 from 0.93). In all three tasks, the perfor-
mance on sentence-level is worse than on document-level
classification. Document-level classification also gener-
alizes better with less difference between training and
validation set F1-scores in Table II. Henceforth, we will
use document-level F1-score as our primary metric when
evaluating the effectiveness of A4NT networks.
5.1.1 Quantifying Privacy Gains from A4NT
We evaluate the performance of our A4NT network us-
ing the attribute classifiers presented in the previous sec-
tion. To obfuscate the authorship of a document, the
A4NT network is run on every sentence in a document
to transfer style from the true attribute to the target one.
For example, to mask age of a teenager written document
we use the A4NT network ZTeen−Adult . Style-transferred
document is input to the attribute classifier of the source
attribute and F1-score of this classifier is computed. This
measures the privacy effectiveness of the style transfer.
Meteor score is computed between the source sentence
and the A4NT output, to measure the semantic similarity.
Table III shows these results in the three settings. On
the small speech dataset all methods, including the au-
toencoder baseline described in Section 4.3, successfully
fool the attribute classifier. They all obtain F1-scores
below the chance-level, with our A4NT networks doing
better. However the meteor scores of all models is signifi-
cantly lower than in the blog dataset, indicating significant
amount of semantic loss in the process of anonymization.
On the larger blog dataset, the autoencoder baseline
fails to fool the attribute classifier, with only a small
drop in F1-score of 0.03 (from 0.88 to 0.85) in case of
age and 0.14 in case of gender (from 0.75 to 0.61) Our
A4NT models however do much better, with all of them
being able to drop the F1-score below the random chance.
The FBsem model using semantic encoder loss
achieves the largest privacy gain, by decreasing the F1-
scores from 0.88 to 0.08 in case of age and from 0.75 to
0.39 in case of gender. This model however suffers from
poor meteor scores, indicating the sentences produced
after the style transfer are no longer similar to the input.
The model using reconstruction likelihood to enforce
semantic consistency, CycML, fares much better in meteor
metric in both age and gender style transfer. It is still able
to fool the classifier, albeit with smaller drops in F1-scores
(still below random chance). Finally, with addition of the
language smoothing loss (CycML+Lang), we see a further
improvement in meteor in the blog-age setting, while the
performance remains similar to CycML on blog-gender
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Model Blog-age data Blog-gender data Speech dataset
Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor
Random classifier 0.54 0.54 - 0.53 0.5 - 0.60 0.61 -
Original text 0.74 0.88 1.0 0.68 0.75 1.0 0.68 1.00 1.0
Autoencoder 0.69 0.85 0.77 0.49 0.61 0.78 0.26 0.12 0.32
A4NT FBsem 0.43 0.08 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.12 0.00 0.28
A4NT CycML 0.49 0.20 0.57 0.41 0.44 0.79 0.11 0.00 0.29
A4NT CycML+Lang 0.54 0.32 0.69 0.44 0.39 0.79 0.12 0.00 0.29
Table III: Performance of the style transfer anonymization in fooling the classifiers, across the three settings. F1 (lower
is better) and Meteor (higher is better). F1-scores below chance levels are shown in italics.
setting and the speech dataset. However, the language
smoothing model CycML+Lang fares better in human
evaluation discussed in Section 5.1.2 and also produces
better qualitative samples as will be seen in Section 5.2.
Generalization to other classifiers: An important ques-
tion to answer if A4NT is to be applied to protect the pri-
vacy of author attributes, is how well it performs against
unseen NLP based adversaries ? To test this we trained
ten different attribute classifiers networks on the blog-age
setting. These networks vary in architectures (LSTM,
CNN and LSTM+CNN) and hyper-parameters (number
of layers and number of units), but all of them achieve
good performance in predicting the age attribute. The
networks were chosen to reflect real-world architecture
choices used for text classification. Results from evaluat-
ing the text generated by the A4NT networks using these
“holdout” classifiers are shown in Table IV. The column
“mean” shows the mean performance of the ten classifiers
and “max” shows the score of best performing classifier
Holdout classifiers have good performance on the orig-
inal text, achieving mean 0.85 document-level F1-score.
Table IV shows that all three A4NT networks generalize
well and are able to drop the document F1-score of the
holdout classifiers to the random chance level (0.54 for
age dataset). They perform slightly worse than on the
seen LSTM classifier, but are able to significantly drop
the performance of all the holdout classifiers (mean F1
score drops from 0.85 to 0.53 or below). This is a strong
empirical evidence that the transformations applied by the
A4NT networks are not specific to the classifier they are
trained with, but can also generalize to other adversaries.
We conclude that the proposed A4NT networks are
able to fool the attribute classifiers on all three tested
tasks and also show generalization ability to fool classifier
architectures not seen during training.
Different operating points : Our A4NT model offers the
ability to obtain multiple different style-transfer outputs
by simply sampling from the models distribution. This
is useful as different text samples might have different
levels of semantic similarity and privacy effectiveness.
Model SeenClassifier
Holdout Classifiers
Mean Max
Original text 0.88 0.85 0.87
Autoencoder 0.85 0.83 0.84
A4NT FBsem 0.08 0.19 0.31
A4NT CycML 0.20 0.41 0.58
A4NT CycML+Lang 0.32 0.53 0.62
Table IV: A4NT anonymization fooling unseen classifiers,
on blogdata (age). Columns are doc-level F1 score.
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Figure 6: Operating points of A4NT models on test set.
Having multiple samples allows users to choose the level
of semantic similarity vs privacy trade-off they prefer.
We illustrate this in Figure 6. Here five samples are
obtained from each A4NT model for each sentence in
the test set. By choosing the sentence with minimum,
maximum or random meteor scores, we can obtain a
trade-off between semantic similarity and privacy. We
see that while the FBsem model offers limited variability,
CycML+LangLoss offers a wide range of choices of oper-
ating points. All operating points of CycML+LangLoss
achieve better meteor score than 0.5, which indicates this
model preserves the semantic similarity well.
5.1.2 Human Judgments for Semantic Consistency
In machine translation and image captioning literature,
it is well known that automatic semantic similarity eval-
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uation metrics like meteor are only reliable to a certain
extent. Evaluation from human judges is still the gold-
standard with which models can be reliably compared.
Accordingly, we conduct human evaluations to judge
the semantic similarity preserved by our A4NT networks.
The evaluations were conducted on a subset of 745 ran-
dom sentences from the test split of the blog-age dataset.
First, output from different A4NT models is obtained for
the 745 test sentences. If any model generates identical
sentences to the input, this model is ranked first automati-
cally without human evaluation. Note that, in some cases,
multiple models can achieve rank-1, when they all pro-
duce identical outputs. The cases without any identical
sentences to the input are evaluated using human annota-
tors on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). An annotator
is shown one input sentence and multiple style-transfer
outputs and is asked to pick the output sentence which is
closest in meaning to the input sentence. Three unique an-
notators are shown each test sample and majority voting
is used to determine the model which ranks first. Cases
with no majority from human evaluators are excluded.
The main goal of the study is to identify which of the
three A4NT networks performs best in terms of semantic
similarity according to human judges. We also compare
the best of our three systems to the baseline model based
on Google machine translation, discussed in Section 4.3.
For the machine translation baseline, we obtain style-
transferred texts from four different language round-trips.
We started with English→German→French→English,
and obtained three more versions with incrementally
adding Spanish, Finnish and finally Armenian languages
into the chain before the translation back to English.
To pick the operating points for the human evaluation
study, we compare the performance of these four ma-
chine translation baselines and our three models on the
human-evaluation test set in Figure 7. Note that here
we show sentence-level F1 score on the y-axis as the
human-evaluation test set is too small for document-level
evaluation. We see that none of the Google machine trans-
lation baselines are able to fool the attribute classifiers.
The model with 5-hop translation achieves best (lowest)
F1-score of 0.81 which is only slightly less than the input
data F1-score of 0.9. This model also achieves signifi-
cantly worse meteor score than any of our A4NT models.
We conduct human evaluation for our style-transfer
models on two operating points of 0.5 F1-score and 0.66
F1-scores, to obtain human judgments at two different
levels of privacy effectiveness as shown in Table V. We
see that the model CycML+Lang outperforms the other
two models at both operating points. CycML+Lang wins
50.74% of the time (ignoring ties) at operating point 0.5
and 57.87% of the time at operating point 0.66. These
results combined with quantitative evaluation discussed in
Section 5.1 confirm that the cyclic ML loss combined with
the language model loss gives the best trade-off between
semantic similarity and privacy effectiveness.
Finally, we conduct human evaluation between the
CycML+Lang model operating at 0.79 and the Google
machine translation baseline with 3 hops. The oper-
ating point is chosen so that the two models are clos-
est to each other in privacy effectiveness and meteor
score. Results in Table VI show that our model wins over
the GoogleMT baseline by approximately 16% (59.46%
vs 43.76% rank1) on semantic similarity as per human
judges, while still having better privacy effectiveness.
This is largely because our A4NT model learns not to
change the input text if it is already ambiguous for the at-
tribute classifier, and only makes changes when necessary.
In contrast, changes made by GoogleMT round trip are
not optimized towards maximizing privacy gain, and can
change the input text even when no change is needed.
5.2 Qualitative Analysis
In this section we analyze some qualitative examples of
anonymized text produced by our A4NT model and try
to identify strengths and weaknesses of this approach.
Then we analyze the performance of the A4NT network
on different levels of input difficulty. We use the attribute
classifiers’ score as a proxy measure of the input text
difficulty. If the text is confidently correctly classified
(with classification score of 1.0) by the attribute classifier,
then the A4NT network has to make significant changes
to fool the classifier. If it is already misclassified, the style-
transfer network should ideally not make any changes.
5.2.1 Examples of Style Transfer for anonymization
Table VII shows the results of our A4NT model Cy-
cML+Lang applied to some example sentences in the
blog-age setting. Style transfer in both directions,
teenager to adult and adult to teenager, is shown along
with the corresponding source attribute classifier scores.
The examples illustrate some of the common changes
made by the model and are grouped into three categories
for analysis (# column in Table VII).
# 1. Using synonyms: The A4NT network often uses
synonyms to change the style to target attribute. This is
seen in style transfers in both directions, teen to adult and
adult to teen in category # 1 samples in Table VII. We
can see the model replacing “yeh” with “ooh”, “would”
with “will”, “...” with “,” and so on when going from
teen to adult, and replacing “funnily enough” with “haha
besides”, “work out” with “go out” and so on when chang-
ing from adult to teen. We can also see that the changes
are not static, but depend on the context. For example
“yeh” is replaced with “alas” in one instance and with
“ooh” in another. These changes do not alter the meaning
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Figure 7: Privacy and semantic consis-
tency of A4NT and the Google MT base-
line on the human eval test set
Operating Point FBsem CycML CycML + Lang
0.66 32.02 39.75 57.87
0.5 15.03 31.68 50.74
Table V: Human evaluation to judge semantic similarity. Three variants of our
model are compared. Numbers show the % times the model ranked first. Can
add to more than 100% as multiple models can have rank-1.
Comparison A4NT CycML + Lang GoogleMT
Operating point 0.79 0.85
% Rank 1 59.46 43.76
Table VI: Human evaluation of our best model and the Google MT baseline.
of the sentence too much, but fool the attribute classifiers
thereby providing privacy to the author attribute.
# 2. Replacing slang words: When changing from teen
to adult, A4NT often replaces the slang words or incor-
rectly spelled words with standard English words, as seen
in category #2 in Table VII. For example, replacing “wad”
(what) with “definitely”, “wadeva” with “perhaps” and
“nuthing” with “ofcourse”. The opposite effect is seen
when going from adult to teenager, with addition of “diz”
(this) and replacing of “think” with “relized” (realized).
These changes are learned entirely from the data, and
would be very hard to encode explicitly in a rule-based
system due to the variety in slangs and spelling mistakes.
# 3. Semantic changes: One failure mode of A4NT is
when the input sentence has semantic content which is
significantly more biased to the author’s class. These
examples are shown in category #3 in Table VII. For
example, when an adult author mentions his “wife”, the
A4NT network replaces it with “crush”, altering the mean-
ing of the input sentence. Some common entity pairs
where this behavior is seen are with (school↔work),
(class↔office), (dad↔husband), (mum↔wife), and so
on. Arguably, in such cases, there is no obvious solution
to mask the identity of the author without altering these
obviously biased content words.
On the smaller speech dataset however, the changes
made by the A4NT model alter the semantics of the sen-
tences in some cases. Few example style transfers from
Obama to Trump’s style are shown in Table VIII. We
see that A4NT inserts hyperbole (“better than anybody”,
“horrible horrible”, “crooked”), references to “media” and
“system”, all salient features of Trump’s style. We see
that the style-transfer here is quite successful, sufficient
to completely fool the identity classifier as was seen in Ta-
ble III. However, and somewhat expectedly, the semantics
of the input sentence is generally lost. A possible cause is
that the attribute classifier is too strong on this data, owing
to the small dataset size and the highly distinctive styles
of the two authors, and to fool them the A4NT network
learns to make drastic changes to the input text.
5.2.2 Performance Across Input Difficulty
Figure 8 compares the attribute classifier score on the
input sentence and the A4NT output. Ideally we want all
theA4NT outputs to score below the decision boundary,
while also not increasing the classifier score compared to
input text. This “ideal score” is shown as grey solid line.
We see that for the most part all three A4NT models are
below or close to this ideal line. As the input text gets
more difficult (increasing attribute classifier score), the
CycML and CycML+Lang slightly cross above the ideal
line, but still provide significant improvement over the
input text (drop in classifier score of about ∼ 0.45).
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Figure 9: Meteor score plot-
ted against input difficulty.
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alongside comparison of meteor score vs privacy gains.
Now, we analyze how much of input semantics is pre-
served with increasing difficulty. Figure 9 plots the meteor
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# Input: Teen A(x) Output: Adult A(x)
1 and yeh... it’s raining lots now 0.97 and ooh... it’s raining lots now 0.23
1 yeahh... i never let anyone really know how i’m feeling. 0.94 anyhow, i never let anyone really know how i’m feeling . 0.24
1 yeh, it’s just goin ok here too! 0.95 alas, it’s just goin ok here too! 0.30
1 would i go so far to say that i love her? 0.52 will i go so far to say that i love her? 0.36
2 wad a nice day.. spend almost the whole afternoon doing work! 0.99 definitely a nice day.. spend almost the whole afternoon doing work! 0.19
2 wadeva told u secrets wad did u do ? 0.98 perhaps told u secrets why did u do ? 0.49
2 i don’t know y i even went into dis relationship 0.92 i don’t know why i even went into another relationship . 0.33
2 i have nuthing else to say about this horrid day. 0.79 i have ofcourse else to say about this accountable day. 0.08
3 after school i got my hair cut so it looks nice again. 1.0 after all i have my hair cut so it looks nice again. 0.42
3 i had an interesting day at skool. 0.97 i had an interesting day at wedding. 0.05
# Input: Adult A(x) Output: Teen A(x)
1 funnily enough , i do n’t care all that much. 0.58 haha besides , i do n’t care all that much. 0.05
1 i may go to san francisco state, or i may go back. 0.54 i shall go to san francisco state, or i may go back. 0.09
1 i wonder if they ’ll work out... hard to say. 0.52 i wonder if they ’ll go out... hard to say. 0.39
2 one is to mix my exercise order a bit more. 0.97 one is to mix my diz exercise order a bit more. 0.08
2 ok, think i really will go to bed now. 0.79 ok, relized i really will go to bed now. 0.08
3 my first day going out to see clients after vacation. 0.98 my first day going out to see some1 after vacation. 0.04
3 i’d tell my wife how much i love her every time i saw her. 0.96 i’d tell my crush how much i love her every time i saw her. 0.06
3 i do believe all you need is love. 0.58 i dont think all you need is love . 0.11
Table VII: Qualitative examples of anonymization through style transfer in the blog-age setting. Style transfer in both
direction is shown along with the attribute classifier score of the source attribute.
Input: Obama Output: Trump
we can do this because we are MISC. we will do that because we are MISC.
we can do better than that. we will do that better than anybody.
it’s not about reverend PERSON. it’s not about crooked PERSON.
but i’m going to need your help. but i’m going to fight for your
country.
so that’s my vision. so that’s my opinion.
their situation is getting worse. their media is getting worse.
i’m kind of the term PERSON
because i do care.
i’m tired of the system of PERSON
PERSON because they don’t care.
that’s what we need to change. that’s what she wanted to change.
that’s how our democracy works. that’s how our horrible horrible
trade deals.
Table VIII: Qualitative examples of style transfer on the
speech dataset from Obama to Trump’s style
score of the A4NT output against the difficulty of input
text. We see that the meteor is high for sentences already
across the decision boundary. These are easy cases, where
the A4NT networks need not intervene. As the input gets
more difficult, the meteor score of the A4NT output drops,
as the network needs to do more changes to be able to fool
the attribute classifier. The CycML+Lang model fares bet-
ter than the other two models, with consistently higher
meteor across the difficulty spectrum.
Figure 10 shows the histogram of privacy gain across
the test set. Privacy gain is the difference between the at-
tribute classifier score on the input and the A4NT network
output. We see that majority of transformations by the
A4NT networks leads to positive privacy gains, with only
a small fraction leading to negative privacy gains. This is
promising given that this histogram is over all the 500k
sentences in the test set. Meteor score plotted against
privacy gain shown in Figure 10, again confirms that large
privacy gains comes with a trade-off of loss in semantics.
6 Conclusions
We presented a novel fully automatic method for protect-
ing privacy sensitive attributes of an author against NLP
based attackers. Our solution, the A4NT network, is de-
veloped using a novel application of adversarial training
to machine translation networks to learn to protect private
attributes. The A4NT network achieves this by learning
to perform style-transfer without paired data.
A4NT offers a new data driven approach to authorship
obfuscation. The flexibility of this end-to-end trainable
model means it can adapt to new attack methods and
datasets. Experiments on three different attributes namely
age, gender and identity, showed that the A4NT network
is able to effectively fool the attribute classifiers in all
the three settings. We also show that the A4NT network
also performs well against multiple unseen classifier ar-
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chitectures. This strong empirical evidence suggests that
the method is likely to be effective against previously
unknown NLP adversaries.
We developed a novel solution to preserve the mean-
ing of input text using likelihood of reconstruction. Se-
mantic similarity (quantified by meteor score) of the
A4NT network remains high for easier sentences, which
do not contain obvious give-away words (school, work,
husband etc.), but is lower on difficult sentences indicat-
ing the network effectively learns to identify and apply
the right magnitude of change. The A4NT network can be
operated at different points on the privacy-effectiveness
and semantic-similarity trade-off curve, and thus offers
flexibility to the user. The experiments on the political
speech data show the limits to which style transfer based
approach can be used to hide attributes. On this chal-
lenging data with very distinct styles by the two authors,
our method effectively fools the identity classifier but
achieves this by altering the semantics of the input text.
In future work we would like to explore generator ar-
chitectures to extend A4NT framework to structured data
like code, to protect against code stylometric attacks.
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A Appendix - Differentiability of discrete
samples
To obtain an output sentence sample s˜y from the
A4NT network Zxy, we can sample from the distribution
p(w˜t |sx), shown in (5), repeatedly until a special ‘END’
token is sampled. This naive sampling though is not suit-
able for training Z within a GAN framework as sampling
from multinomial distribution, p(w˜t |sx), is not differen-
tiable.
To make sampling differentiable we follow the ap-
proach used in [35] and use the Gumbel-Softmax approx-
imation [36] to obtain differentiable soft samples from
p(w˜t |sx). The gumbel-softmax approximation includes
two parts. First, the re-parametrization trick using the
gumbel random variable is applied to make the process of
sampling from a multinomial distribution differentiable
with respect to the probabilities p(w˜t |sx). Next, softmax
is used to approximate the arg-max operator to obtain
“soft” samples instead of one-hot vectors. This makes
the samples themselves differentiable. Thus, the gumbel-
softmax approximation allows differentiating through sen-
tence samples from the A4NT network enabling end-to-
end GAN training. Further details on gumbel-softmax
approximation can be found in [36, 47].
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